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ABSTRACT 
 
Automation of certain tasks in a Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) control room is expected 
to result in reduced operators’ mental workload, which may induce other benefits such as 
enhanced situation awareness and improved system performance. The final goal should be 
higher level of operational safety. Thus, recent works are increasingly assessing automation. 
The LABIHS compact NPP simulator, though, still operates under strictly manual printed 
hard-copy procedures, despite of the fact that the simulator incorporates several 
advancements in design of digitalized Human–System Interfaces (HSIs). This work presents 
the development, implementation and integration of selected components to achieve 
increased level of computerized/automated operation of the LABIHS compact NPP 
simulator. Specifically, we discuss three components: (i) Automatic Plant Mode Detection, 
(ii) Automatic Alarm Filtering, and (iii) Computerized Procedures. Each one of these 
components has to be carefully designed/integrated so that one can avoid the undesired 
effects of some known implementations of automated systems on NPP, such as the reduction 
in the operator's system awareness, an increase in monitoring workload, and the degradation 
in manual skills, which could lead to automation-induced system failures. 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Nuclear power plant (NPP) control room operators observe and manipulate an extremely 
complex system.  In the past, this required walking along a large control panel, taking 
readings from gauges and adjusting knobs and levers.  Many of today’s control rooms have 
replaced or augmented older, more cumbersome control panels with visual display units 
(VDUs).  VDUs can simplify the human machine interface, but they also introduce new 
design challenges. Digitalization of previous analog man-machine interfaces imposes new 
coordination demands on the operational teams, as the need for communication to construct 
situation awareness – unlike the old analog control rooms, in the new “advanced” interfaces 
all operators can assess almost all the information about the plant from his/her workplace [1]. 
This greatly increases the amount of information and tasks each operator needs to manage.  
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Among the tasks of an operator are the monitoring of plant status, manipulating of control 
devices, as well a large set of complex and mentally taxing activities, such as information 
gathering, planning and decision making.  In such a complex and safety-critical system, 
human error could result in serious accidents due to the inherently high level of complexity of 
interfaces, task loads, information overload, dynamic situations and annoying 
unnecessary/redundant alarms. 
 
Thus, in the last decades, human-system interface of NPP has been extensively developed 
and improved [2,3,4,5]. One of the most assessed subjects of these improvements is the 
Operators’ mental workload [6,7]. In general, reduced mental workload is achieved by 
automation of certain tasks. Automation may also induce other benefits such as enhanced 
situation awareness and improved system performance. 
 
The LABIHS compact NPP simulator [8] servers a set of purposes, such as control room 
modernization projects, designing of operator aiding systems, providing technological 
expertise for graphical user interfaces (GUIs) designing; control rooms and interfaces 
evaluations considering both ergonomics and human factors aspect, interaction analysis in 
scenarios considering simulated accidents and normal operation. Fig. 1 shows the LABIHS’  
main control room. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  Overview of the LABIHS 
 
 
This system incorporates several advances in design of digitalized Human–System Interfaces 
(HSIs), but it still operates under strictly manual printed hard-copy procedures. Also, neither 
automated plant mode indicator nor an alarm suppression system is currently available. These 
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limitations are incompatible with the idea of modern human-system interface 
implementations. 
 
This work presents the development, implementation and integration of selected components 
to achieve a higher level of computerized/automated operation on a specific target system: the 
LABIHS compact NPP simulator [8]. Specifically, we discuss three components: (i) 
Automatic Plant Mode Detection, (ii) Automatic Alarm Filtering, and (iii) Computerized 
Procedures [8]. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brings a brief overview of the LABIHS compact 
NPP simulator. In Section 3, we present the implemented automatic plant mode detection 
system. In Section 4 the automatic alarm suppression system is introduced. In Section 5 we 
assess the computerized computer procedure system. Finally, Section 6 brings conclusions 
and future work. 
 
 
2. LABIHS COMPACT SIMULATOR OVERVIEW 
 
Broadly, the simulator is composed of a set of applications that communicates between each 
other through a Shared Memory, as shown in Fig. 2.  
 
The Modeling Program is the main component of the simulator. It contains all mathematical 
models that represent the most relevant characteristics of a pressurized water reactor power 
plant. The Instruction Station module allows for an instructor to interact with the ongoing 
simulation to provide commands according to which scenario he wants to make available to 
the operators.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2:  LABIHS 
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Three other modules provide logs and reports: RealTime Scheduler is used to set timers and 
schedule tasks for both Parameter Logger and Alarm List modules; the Parameter Logger 
module stores, into files, a set of variables describing history of past simulator states; the 
Alarm List module provides alarms that guide the operators during the power plant operation 
procedures.  
 
The integration of all three modules (e.g. automatic plant mode detection, automatic alarm 
filtering, computerized procedures) assessed by this paper to the simulator is achieved by 
attaching each of them to the shared memory. 
 
 
3. AUTOMATIC PLANT MODE DETECTION 
 
The purpose of the Automatic Plant Mode Detection module is to monitor a set of 
neutronic/thermodynamic variables and, based on its values, decide in which operation mode 
the plant is currently on. The operational modes are defined as follows: (1) Refueling, (2) 
Cold Shutdown, (3) Hot Shutdown, (4) Standby, (5) Startup, and (6) Power Operation.  
Let Keff be the reactivity condition, Tp be the percentage of the thermal power and Tcold be 
the average temperature of cold legs. The operational modes are defined as shown on Table 
1. 
 
Table 1:  Definition of all six operational modes 
 
Variable Range 
Keff Tp (%) Tcold () 
 
Operational Mode 
<= 0.95 <= 57 Refueling 
57 < Tcold <= 99 Cold Shutdown 
99 < Tcold <= 177 Hot Shutdown 
 
0.95 <  Keff  <  0.99 
 
 
= 0 
Hot Standby 
 0 < Tp <= 5 Startup 
Keff >= 0.99 > 5 
 
>= 177 
Power Operation 
 
 
Once the operational mode is known, the Automatic Plant Mode detection module writes the 
current operational mode to specific state variable at the simulator’s shared memory, making 
it available to all modules (Fig. 2).  
 
The LABIHS Graphic User Interface (GUI), then, monitors this shared memory variable and 
updates a Plant Mode indicator at the upper left corner of the screen, as highlighted in Fig. 4 
and Fig. 5. 
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Figure 4:  LABIHS’s Main Screen with the Automatic Plant Mode indicator on the 
upper left corner. 
 
The Plant Mode indicator is present on all GUI screens of the LABIHS simulator. This way, 
the operator is always aware of the system’s current operational. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5:  LABIHS’s Reactor Coolant System with the Automatic Plant Mode indicator 
on the upper left corner. 
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2. AUTOMATIC ALARM FILTERING 
 
The main purpose of the Automatic Alarm Filtering module is to suppress an unnecessary 
alarm based on four sources of information: Cause-Consequence, Operational Mode, 
Redundancy and Initializer Event.  
 
The Cause-Consequence alarm suppression is performed when a set of alarms are enabled, 
but a subset of the alarms refers to consequences and not a root cause. If this is the case, then 
all consequences of a given cause may be suppressed.  
 
For example, consider the selected set of alarms shown in Table 2. Suppose that the 
Intermediate range high flux rod stop alarm on the first row (alarm ID 1) is currently on 
(enabled). The cause-consequence column indicates that alarm ID 34 is a root cause. Then, if 
alarm RCO trip intermediate range hi, on row 34, is also enable, then Intermediate range 
high flux rod stop should be suppressed. 
 
Table 2:  Automatic Alarm Suppression Module Overview 
 
Alarm ID On screen 
name 
Cause-
Consequence 
Operational 
Mode 
Redundancy Initializer 
Event 
 
1 
Intermediate 
range hi flux 
rod stop 
 
34 
 
1,2,3 
  
 
2 
Power range 
overpower 
rod stop 
36 1,2,3   
7 CCWS outlet 
temp hi 
 No 
supression 
  
8 Instrument 
air press lo 
 No 
suppression 
  
9 RWST water 
level lo-lo 
 No 
suppression 
  
10 L/D hx outlet 
flow lo 
16,38,39,69 No 
suppression 
  
11 L/D hx outlet 
flow hi 
12 No 
suppression 
  
34 Intermediate 
range hi flux 
RCT Trip 
    
42 MSL press 
low si iso 
RCT trip 
 1,2,3  Yes 
45 CTMT sump 
water level hi 
 No 
suppression 
46  
46 CTMT sump 
wter level  
hi-hi 
 No 
suppression 
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Figure 3:  How the three integrated modules contribute to workload reduction 
 
73 MSIV trip  1,2,3   
88 TBN 
overspeed hi 
tbn trip 
 1,2,3,4  Yes 
90 Generator 
break open 
 1,2,3,4,5   
 
 
Another source of alarm filtering is the Operational Mode, as shown in Fig. 3.  
 
 
 
The basic idea of the Operational Mode alarm filtering is to suppress all non-indispensable 
alarms, given a given operational mode. For instance, on Alarm ID 1 of Table 2, the 
Operational Mode column indicates that the Intermediate range high flux rod stop alarm 
should be suppressed when the plant is on operational mode Refueling, Cold Shutdown or 
Hot Shutdown.  
 
If there is no operational mode suppression for a given alarm, the no suppression mark is in 
place, as shown in alarm IDs 7 to 11 on Table 2. 
 
The Redundancy shown on the fifth column represents the third source for alarm filtering 
considered. On Table 2, alarm ID 45 (CTMT sump water level hi) is marked, on the fifth 
column as redundant to alarm 46 (CTMT sump water level hi-hi). This means that if alarm 46 
is enabled, then alarm 45 should be suppressed. 
  
 
The last column of Table 2 refers to the last case of alarm filtering considered in this work: 
The Initializer Event. The purpose of this technique is to detect which one of several events 
was the first one in time to trigger. All events initiated after the first one should be 
suppressed. 
 
 
Automatic 
Alarm Filtering 
 
Computerized 
Procedures 
 
Automatic Plant 
Mode Detection 
 
Reduced 
Workload 
Alarm filtering 
depends on the 
current NPP 
operation mode 
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Suppose the case in which turbine trip alarms are on, as well as the control rods trip alarm. It 
may take a considerable amount of time for the operator to identify which one of the two 
events happened in first place. The Initializer Event suppression module keeps track of a 
history of events. For example, if the turbine trip was the first triggered event, then the 
control rods trip alarm should be suppressed. 
 
We highlight that the Initializer Event alarm filtering is at the final stages of development. 
What is already currently available are which events on the alarm system are bound for 
filtering. These events are marked with a “Yes” indication on the Initializer Event column on 
Table 2.  
 
Notwithstanding, it is already clear that the Neuro-Fuzzy transient identification system 
developed by our workgroup [10] will be very useful to the development of the Initializer 
Event alarm filtering system. 
 
 
 
3. COMPUTERIZED PROCEDURES 
 
 
Plant operation procedures are used to guide operators in coping with normal, abnormal or 
emergency situations in a process control system.  Historically, the plant procedures have 
been paper-based (PBP). The digitalization trend in these complex systems computer-based 
procedures (CBPs) are being developed to support procedure use. 
 
The development and evaluation of computerized operation procedures for advanced control 
rooms is one of research areas of the Human-System Interface Laboratory (LABIHS) [10,11].  
In [10, and [11] we developed a CBPs system in the LABIHS simulator.  The ImPRO CBP 
[11] construction tool was chosen for our implementation because it is available for 
download on the Internet. 
 
A procedure in ImPRO is decomposed into steps, and a step is decomposed into both actions 
and check.  Both elements are connected in the flowchart.  After either action or check is 
performed, the next action or check is ready to perform.  Action has single input arrow and 
single output arrow, whereas check has single input arrow and double output arrows 
according to its evaluation.  Fig. 6 shows a snapshot of ImPRO. 
 
 
INAC 2015, São Paulo, SP, Brazil. 
 
. 
Figure 6: ImPRO main page 
 
An action consists of message, set, input, finish, initiate, and caution.  A check consists of 
auto-check, man-check, and cautions.  These atomic instructions are combined to describe 
objective of both action and check.  The binding logic is only n-out-of-m operator and can be 
nested.  The logic is rendered in success logic tree in the right upper pane in Fig. 6. 
 
 
 
Figure 7:  Implemented CBP 
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The atomic instructions have three-state value; true, false, and unknown.  The value is 
determined by process variables.  The n-out-of-m operator produces also three states.  The 
driving force for the execution comes from crew attempt to make the current action or check 
resolved.  After resolution, operators move to the next action or check. 
 
The example shown in Fig. 7, illustrates a scenario in which the system is under a transient 
event. The operator uses a CBP and, at the end of the procedure, he was able to understand 
that the transient is an ATWS (Anticipated Transients Without Scram). Also, a computerized 
recovery procedure is provided. 
 
 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS  
 
In this work, a system based on a set of three different components was presented: (i) 
Automatic Plant Mode Detection, (ii) Automatic Alarm Filtering, and (iii) Computerized 
Procedures. The final goal of this framework is to (1) achieve a level of reduction of the 
operator workload during normal and emergency operations, and (2) to decrease the time 
necessary to identify the root causes of a transient to the LABIHS compact NPP Simulator. 
 
The proposed framework is currently integrated LABIHS compact NPP simulator. A single 
module, the alarm filtering system, is at final stages of implementation and will soon be 
integrated. 
 
The implemented framework was tested in the LABIHS simulator for preliminary evaluation.  
Evaluations were performed using typical cases of regular and emergency operations.  These 
operations include NPP power up from the refueling operational mode to the power 
operational mode. 
 
Several scenarios of operation using the alarm filtering systems were compared to the 
operation through the previous version of the simulator, showing advantages on the reduction 
on the workload as well as on the time necessary to identify/solve transients.   
 
The next stage of this research is the completion of the initializer event system.  This system 
must be able to further reduce workload and speed up transient detection by the operators. 
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